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This research is used to determine the influence of political connections on tax 
avoidance. Researchers use government ownership and directors and commissioners 
who hold multiple positions as former government officials and military officials to 
measure variable political connections. Tax avoidance is measured using cash effective 
tax rate (CETR). The data in this study used secondary data in annual reports on 
companies included in the Jakarta Islamic Index period 2015-2018. The method used in 
this study is quantitative analysis, and the results show that political connections 
through government ownership affect tax avoidance; the same is also evident in 
political connections through BOD profiles and BOC profiles affecting tax avoidance. 
Keywords: Tax Avoidance, Political Connection, Sharia Stock 
 
Abstrak 
Penelitian ini digunakan untuk mengetahui pengaruh koneksi politik terhadap tax 
avoidance. Peneliti menggunakan kepemilikan pemerintah dan direksi maupun 
komisaris yang merupakan rangkap jabatan sebagai ataupun mantan pejabat 
pemerintahan, pejabat militer untuk mengukur variabel koneksi politik. Tax avoidance 
diukur menggunakan cash effective tax rate (CETR). Data pada penelitian ini 
menggunakan data sekunder berupa annual report pada perusahaan yang termasuk 
dalam Jakarta Islamic Index periode 2015-2018. Metode yang digunakan dalam 
penelitian ini adalah analisis kuantitatif, dan hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa 
koneksi politik melalui kepemilikan pemerintahan berpengaruh terhadap tax avoidance, 
hal yang sama juga terbukti pada koneksi politik melalui profil BOD dan profil BOC 
berpengaruh terhadap tax avoidance.  





In developing and developed countries, economic growth impacts the imposition 
of taxes and tax revenues in a Country (Davoodi & Zou, 1998). Ardani (2010) added 
that it should have been included, or tax receipts could be stable if not affected by 
changes in the global economy. This has made the Indonesian government more active 
in increasing its primary revenue in terms of tax receipts. This also makes the 
Indonesian government continue to push for improvements in the tax sector, among 
others, in 1983 there were changes to the tax system from the official assessment system 
to the self assessment system (Devano & Wato, 2006).  
The change of the system to self assessment system did not have a good 
improvement, but the reality of the proportion of tax receipts to the state budget 
increased in the last five years, since 2015 – 2019 shows an increase of 73% in 2015 to 
84% in 2019. The increase cannot yet represent that all potential taxation is maximal, 
because many still do not care about the importance of fulfilling the tax obligations of 
both corporate taxpayers and private tax payers. In the period 2015 – 2019 also shows 
that tax receipts did show an increase, but have not met the target. 
The achievement of the State revenue target through this tax is influenced by 
various factors, one of which is the practice of tax avoidance. Mardiasmo (2011) 
explained that there are actions done deliberately to avoid tax, namely tax avoidance 
and tax evasion. Tax avoidance is an attempt to reduce taxes paid to the State without 
violating any tax laws or regulations. In contrast, Tax evasion is an attempt to alleviate 
taxes paid to the State in violation of regulations or laws.   
In Corporate Taxpayers, for example, companies make efforts to minimize the 
cost of paying taxes without violating tax rules. This is done because of the more 
significant the Company's profit, the greater the tax that must be deposited to the State. 
Wicaksono (2017) said to achieve the goal of paying taxes efficiently and not to violate 
regulations, one of them by doing proper tax planning. This goal can be achieved one of 
them by doing tax avoidance, which is one way of tax planning to manage its profit or 
income in order to minimize the tax that must be deposited; the effort is legitimate even 
though it reduces the State's receipts, but can not be penalized for not violating 
regulations and being in the grey area (Zain, 2008). Maharani & Suardana (2014) argue 
that tax avoidance is unique because it is a legitimate and often done company, but is 
not desirable by the government because it reduces receipts.  
The practices used as the use of weaknesses in tax regulation do not violate the 
tax code, so it is legal to do so.Hanlon & Heitzman (2010) explains that in the context 
of tax compliance, a person is affected by factors including tax rates, sanctions or fines, 
and tax evasion.Prebble & Prebble (2009) argued that the initial nature of tax avoidance 
was not biased in sanctioning the Company directly, but sanctions could be imposed if 
there were laws governing restrictions on the use of tax avoidance.  
Several studies have been conducted to study tax avoidance, such as research 
conducted byDyreng et al. (2010) and Budiman (2012) which measures tac avoidance 
with CETR (Cash Effective Tax Rate) by dividing Cash tax paid with Pretax income. 
Besides, some studies mention that tax avoidance is also influenced by other factors, 
namely the size of the Company and the character of the executive(Pranoto & Widagdo, 
2016). Another factor being considered in tax avoidance is political connections or 
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proximity to the government.Zhang et al.(2012) mention that companies that have ties 
to the government and have political connections show lower tax avoidance than 
companies with no relationship with the government.  
The preparation of the Company's strategy to compete with competitors should 
utilize all potentials, including political connections or good relations with the 
government (Leuz & Gee, 2006). Faccio (2006) added that every Company wants a 
good relationship with the government to get preferential treatment, primarily if a 
government official owns the Company or there are government officials who have a 
particular position in the Company. It is also made clear by Faccio (2006) that a limited 
company is said to have political connections if there is one major shareholder or one of 
the leaders in the Company, whether the CEO, president director or has a relationship 
with a political even if one of its leaders is a member of a political. 
Political connections are also useful in minimizing the cost of taxes to be 
deposited and corporate access to dealing with the central government (Kim & Zhang, 
2016). Many developing countries have companies with political connections, such as 
having proximity to the government, so that officials or members of politicalies have 
positions as commissioners and directors (Fisman, 2001). As is the case in Indonesia, 
there are many government-related companies, from the shareholding structure to 
government officials' placement in certain positions in the Company. This attracted 
researchers to research political connections and tax avoidance with a sample of 
companies recorded in the Jakarta Islamic Index. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Agency Theory 
Large companies are supposed to separate wealth between the owner and the 
Company, this is done so that the owner gives the authority to manage the Company, 
including taking strategic decisions. The agency theory explains the relationship 
between the owner of the Company and the management or manager of the Company. 
Jensen (1986) explained that the principal would authorize the agent to manage his 
property, both parties bound by a contract of employment consisting of their respective 
rights and obligations. 
Agency theory is relevant to this research related to the difference of authority 
between the Company and the government in terms of tax receipts and tax payments 
made by the Company. The government, considered the Company's principal owner, 
wants the maximum tax revenue possible, while the Company's management wants a 
high profit without having to pay high taxes anyway. This is the point of difference and 
creates a conflict of interest. 
 
Tax Avoidance 
Tax avoidance is an activity used to transfer resources that should be paid to the 
State to shareholders to generate higher returns (Butje & Tjondro, 2014). The 
explanation is provided by Zain (2008) that tax avoidance is part of tax planning carried 
out through profit management, to minimize taxes paid to the State without violating tax 
regulations.   
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Tax avoidance does not include unlawful acts, but actions that take advantage of 
tax regulation opportunities in a State. The act of reducing this tax liability without 
violating the rules can be considered lawful. The nature of tax avoidance is also not to 
blame and is punishable or punished. EvenPrebble & Prebble (2009) explained that 
sanctions could have been imposed if there were laws governing limits on tax 
avoidance.   
Tax avoidance can be measured by several formulas, namely Effective Tax Rate 
(ETR), Cash Effective Tax rate (CETR), and Book Tax Differences (BTD). Here are 
some measurement categories of tax avoidance; 
Effective Tax rate (ETR) is a measurement considered to show the difference between 
book profit and fiscal profit. Besides, ETR also sees the tax expense paid in the current 
year (Utami & Setyawan, 2015) the formula as follows; 
 
Cash Effective Tax Rate (CETR) is a measurement seen based on the comparison of 
the amount of tax paid with pretax profit(Rusydi & Martani, 2014) formulated as 
follows; 
 
Book Tax Differences (BTD) is the difference between accounting profit and fiscal 
profit judging by temporary differences and indicated by deferred tax expense account 
(Rusydi & Martani, 2014) formulated as follows; 
 
Political Connections 
The Company can be said to have political connections if one of the major 
shareholders or one of the Company's leaders, whether the CEO, board of directors, or 
commissioner, is a member of parliament, minister, or who has a special relationship 
with the government or political(Faccio, 2006).Gomez(2009) also added that companies 
with unique relationships with the government belong to companies that make political 
connections. Special relationship means as one of the government-owned companies, 
either in the form of BUMN  orBUMD. 
Some companies want to have a special relationship with the government or 
political to have a lower detection risk because politicians are considered to protect the 
Company in terms of its taxation. Furthermore, the Company may also get the latest 








Wicaksono (2017) stated that political connections have a positive impact and 
negative impact on tax avoidance. The positive impact of the Company getting 
preferential treatment from the government related to its tax aspects, tax avoidance 
checks and others. Meanwhile, the negative impact in the form of State revenue is 
reduced due to tax avoidance carried out by the Company. Zhang et al. (2012) showed 
that political connections have an effect on tax aggressiveness, which Fisman (2001) 
also pointed out that political connections often occur in developing countries, where 
there are parties placed in the organizational structure of companies, of course, that have 
a special relationship with the government. Based on the study, the first hypothesis 
taken was; 
H1: Political connections affect tax avoidance 
Aside from some of the research mentioned above, other things affect tax 
avoidance, such as BOC and BOD profiles in a company. Lestari & Putri (2017) 
concluded that corporate governance, political connections, and leverage have a 
simultaneous tax avoidance effect.Butje & Tjondro (2014) also mentioned that 
executive character and political connections have a significant effect on tax avoidance, 
while variable control in the form of company size, leverage, and sales growth also has 
a significant positive effect on tax avoidance. Therefore from the study, the second 
hypothesis is taken;  
H2: BOC and BOD profiles affect tax avoidance 
 
METHOD 
Type of research 
This research uses quantitative methods, which are approaches that look at a 
reality that can be clarified, observed, measured, and causal between variables 
(Sugiyono, 2010). The research was conducted on companies included in the Jakarta 
Islamic Index period 2015-2018, with the criteria fixed in each announcement of a list 
of securities including sharia stocks. 
Variable Operational Definition 
The independent variables used in this study are political connections. The 
Company can be said to have political connections if one of the major shareholders or 
one of the Company's leaders, whether the CEO, board of directors, or commissioner, is 
a member of parliament, minister, or who has a special relationship with the 
government or political (Faccio, 2006). Gomez (2009) also added that companies with 
unique relationships with the government belong to companies that make political 
connections. Political connection variables are measured using dummy variables, which 
are given a value of 1 for companies that meet one of the criteria of political 
connections and are given a value of 0 if they do not meet the political connection 
criteria. Among the criteria for political connections are; 1) The Board of Directors or 
Board of Commissioners concurrently politicians; 2) The Board of Directors or Board 
of Commissioners concurrently as a government official; 3) The Board of Directors or 
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Board of Commissioners concurrently positions as military officers; 4) The owner of 
the Company or shareholder is a member of a political, government official, military 
official, former government official or former military official (Utari & Supadmi, 2017). 
The dependent variable in this study was tax avoidance. Activity is used to 
transfer resources that should be paid to the State to shareholders generates higher 
returns (Butje & Tjondro, 2014). The explanation is provided byZain(2008) that tax 
avoidance is part of tax planning carried out through profit management, to minimize 
taxes paid to the State without violating tax regulations. The measurement used in this 
study is CETR. Cash Effective Tax Rate (CETR) is a measurement seen based on the 
comparison of the amount of tax paid with pretax profit(Rusydi & Martani, 2014) 
formulated as follows; 
 
 
Data Analysis  
The data to be processed in this study uses multiple linear regression models. 
Regression methods can be used to show how independent variables affect dependent 
variables (Ghozali, 2006). Multiple linear regression equations can be seen as follows: 
 
Description: 
CETR  = Cash Effective Tax Rate 
POLCON1 = Political connections through shareholdings 
POLCON2 = Political connections through BOC & BOD 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
One way to see normality is to look at the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test. Normality test results can be seen as follows: 
Table 1 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
Model  Unstandardized 
Residual 
N  88 
 Mean 0E-7 
Normal Parameters Std. Deviation 21.67719443 
 Absolute .133 
Most Extreme Differences Positive .133 
 Negative -.077 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z  1.249 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .088 
Source: Data Processing 
 
Based on table 1, it appears that the value of Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z of 1,249 
with a significant rate of 0.088 means that the distributed research variable is normal 
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due to its signification rate≥0.05, so that tax avoidance and political connections are 
distributed normally. Besides, the next stage is to test the top multicholiners conducted 
to test whether there is a correlation between independent variables in the regression 
model. Statistical identification of the existing or not multicollinearity symptoms can be 
made by determining the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance Value (TOL). 
 
Table 2 





t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta   Tolerance VIF 
Constant 40.042 3.515  11.391 .000   
Polcon 1 16.348 6.041 .334 2.706 .008 .704 1.420 
Polcon 2 -12.982 5.608 -.286 -2.315 .023 .704 1.420 
Source: Data Processing 
 
Based on table 2 obtained results that all variables are free of tolerance values 
above 0.10 and VIF values are smaller than 10, meaning that all free variables in this 
study have no symptoms of multicollinearity with the rule if VIF<10 and tolerance 
value>0.10, then there are no symptoms of multicollinearity (Ghozali, 2006). 
The next stage of the autocorrelation test aims to test whether there is a 
correlation between disruptive errors in the t period and undue errors in the previous 




Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 




1 .299 .089 .068 21.93074 1.722 
Source: Data Processing 
 
Based on table 3, it can be noted that the autocorrelation test results show a DW 
value of 1,722 more than the DU value of 1,699; hence no autocorrelation (Ghozali, 









B Std. Error Beta 
Constant 40.042 3.515  11.391 .000 
Polcon 1 16.348 6.041 .334 2.706 .008 
Polcon 2 -12.982 5.608 -.286 -2.315 .023 
Source: Data Processing 
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Based on the calculation results presented in table 4, showing a significance 
value of 0.008, which means the value of significance is smaller than 0.05, then H0 is 
successfully rejected, and hypothesis 1 is supported. So it can be concluded that 
political connections through shareholding affect tax avoidance. The results of this 
study also show that political connections positively impact getting preferential 
treatment from the government regarding aspects of taxation. This research also 
supportsZhang et al. (2012) finding that political connections affect tax aggressiveness. 
As well asFisman (2001) pointed out states that political connections often occur in 
developing countries, where there are parties placed in the company's organizational 
structure, of course, who have a special relationship with the government. The same 
findings also relate toKim & Zhang’s (2016) research on political connections 
impacting the government's preferential treatment in terms of taxation, such as avoiding 
tax checks.  
The second hypothesis test showed a significance value of 0.023, which means 
the value of significance is smaller than 0.05, then H0 is successfully rejected, and 
hypothesis 2 is supported. So it can be concluded that political connections through the 
board of commissioners' profile and the board of directors affect tax avoidance. The 
results of this study also support what Wicaksono (2017) says profiles of the board of 
commissioners and the board of directors originating from political parties, government 
officials, and military officials influential on tax avoidance. What Utari & Supadmi 
(2017) and Butje & Tjondro (2014) stated how independent commissioners and audit 
committees' existence affect tax avoidance is also relevant to this research. Companies 
that feel privileged by the government tend to commit tax evasion because they feel 
protected and will not be examined in detail by the tax authorities.   
Researchers found that some companies have military connections. This is 
evidenced by former military officials who have certain positions such as being one of 
the board of commissioners. Similarly, former government officials were also found to 
have served as commissioners at one of the Jakarta Islamic Index list companies. The 
criteria of companies listed in the Jakarta Islamic Index are only the 30 most liquid 
sharia stocks with the review process twice a year. This should also be a filter that the 
sharia stocks that enter are viable and most liquid. It is also seen from the highest 
average market capitalization for a year and has the highest average value of daily 
transactions in the stock market. It should be that sharia stocks listed in the Jakarta 
Islamic Index are an example of taxpayers who are compliant with other companies on 
the stock exchange. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The research was conducted to test the influence of political connections through 
shareholdings and the board of commissioners' profile and the board of directors on tax 
avoidance. Political connection variables are measured using dummy variables, where 
the political connection criteria are; 1) The Board of Directors or Board of 
Commissioners concurrently politicians; 2) The Board of Directors or Board of 
Commissioners concurrently as a government official; 3) The Board of Directors or 
Board of Commissioners concurrently positions as military officers; 4) The owner of 
the company or shareholder is a member of a political party, government official, 
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military official, former government official or former military official (Utari & 
Supadmi, 2017). In comparison, tax avoidance is measured by Cash Effective Tax Rate 
(CETR), a measurement seen based on the comparison of the amount of tax paid with 
profit before tax (Rusydi & Martani, 2014). 
The results showed that political connections through shareholdings and the 
board of commissioners' profile and board of directors influenced tax avoidance. This 
means companies that feel privileged by the government tend to commit tax avoidance 
because they feel protected and will not be examined in detail by the tax authorities. 
This study's results have implications for the company can be used as an additional 
insight so that the management of the company can do tax planning well and not violate 
tax regulations that can harm the State despite having political connections. The results 
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